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This paper studies competition between rms when consumers observe a pri-
vate signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures
which induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures which
are optimal for rms and those which are optimal for consumers. The rm-optimal
policy amplies underlying product di¤erentiation, thereby relaxing competition,
while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing
total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens di¤erentiation, which inten-
sies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less-preferred prod-
uct. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information
possessed by consumers can be designed exibly.
Keywords: Information design, Bertrand competition, product di¤erentiation,
online platforms.
JEL classication: D43, D83, L13
1 Introduction
In many markets rms supply di¤erentiated products and compete in prices. Con-
sumers might not always possess all information about product attributes when they
We are grateful to Jason Abaluck, Heski Bar-Isaac, Dirk Bergemann, Glenn Ellison, Joe Farrell,
Nima Haghpanah, Hanna Halaburda, Ju Hu, Bruno Jullien, Fei Li, Stephen Morris, Xiaosheng Mu,
Barry Nalebu¤, Andrew Rhodes, David Sappington, Armin Schmutzler, Philipp Strack, John Vickers,
Weijie Zhong and various seminar audiences for helpful comments. Armstrong thanks the European
Research Council for nancial support from Advanced Grant 833849.
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make their purchase decision, and market performance crucially depends on how much
information consumers possess about products. If little such information is available,
consumers cannot meaningfully compare products and so will regard them as close sub-
stitutes. This induces rms to compete ercely, so price is low, but consumers often
end up purchasing a mismatched product. When more product information is avail-
able, the quality of the consumer-product match improves, but this also endows rms
with greater market power and so raises price. This broad trade-o¤ between match
quality and price is well known, but there has been little systematic investigation of
the interaction between the amount of product information consumers have and the
intensity of competition. For example, is more information for consumers always as-
sociated with increased market power of rms? Can biased information provision
which favors one rm over others help relax price competition? In which direction is
the trade-o¤between match quality and market price optimally resolved for consumers?
More generally, what kind of information provision is optimal for rm prot and what
kind is optimal for consumer welfare? This paper aims to answer these questions.
These questions are also important when a third-party can design the information
environment that consumers face. For instance, consumers often gather information and
make purchases via a platform (e.g., Amazon or Expedia) which hosts competing rms.
The platform can control many aspects of the information environment consumers face,
such as how detailed is the product information it displays, whether to post customer
reviews or its own reviews, whether to o¤er personalized recommendations, how ex-
ibly consumers can lter and compare products, and so on. How should the platform
design its information environment if it aims to maximize industry prot, or consumer
surplus, or a weighted sum of them?1 When some products (e.g., insurance plans)
are di¢ cult for consumers to compare, regulators sometimes intervene by specifying
how rms should disclose product information, aiming to enhance consumersability
to select their preferred product. But is a more transparent information environment
always better for consumers, given the potentially adverse e¤ect on price competition
of information improvement?2
1What a platform aims to maximize depends partly on which sides of the market it can levy fees,
which in turn depends on the relative intensity of platform competition across the two sides of the
market. We do not explicitly model strategic platforms in this paper.
2See, e.g., https://go.cms.gov/2U2lZJe for information transparency regulation in the US health
insurance market. Sometimes the regulator may even require rms to o¤er standardizedproducts to
facilitate comparison. This involves a similar trade-o¤ to information regulation: more standardized
products are close substitutes and so facilitate competition on price, but prevent some consumers with
particular preferences from obtaining a product tailored to those preferences. See, e.g., Ericson and
Starc (2016) for a discussion and empirical analysis of this issue in the context of health insurance
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Formally, as described in section 2, we study an ex ante symmetric duopoly market
where two rms each costlessly supply a single variety of a product and compete in
prices. Consumers are initially uncertain about their preferences for the varieties, but
before purchase they receive a private signal of these preferences. Consumers then
update their beliefs about their preferences and make their choice given the pair of prices
o¤ered by rms. The information environment or signal structure, which governs the
mapping between consumerstrue preferences and the signals they receive, is publicly
known to both rms and consumers. We wish to understand how the signal structure
a¤ects competition and welfare. In particular, we explore the limits to competition
in this market: which signal structures induce the highest prot for rms and which
generate the highest surplus for consumers?3
Solving our problem at the most general level is challenging. Consumer preferences
are generally two-dimensional in our setup, and current understanding of information
design in such cases is limited.4 For this reason, we rst focus on the case when the
outside option for consumers is irrelevant, and so only the relative valuation between
the two products a scalar variable matters for consumer decisions. Even with scalar
heterogeneity, under some signal structures the only equilibria in the pricing game
between rms involve mixed strategies, which can be hard to deal with. For this reason,
we mostly focus on signal structures which induce a pure strategy equilibrium in the
pricing game. (Towards the end of the paper, we report what progress can be made
when the outside option might bind or when mixed strategies are allowed.)
Our analysis starts in section 3.1 with a distinct pricing problem, which does not
concern information design per se. We describe the set of relative valuation distributions
(if any) which support a given pair of prices as equilibrium prices. It turns out that
a price pair can be implemented if and only if the valuation distribution lies between
two bounds, which are determined by each rms no-deviation condition in equilibrium.
Using these bounds we characterize the range of possible pure strategy equilibrium
exchange.
3Another interpretation of the consumer-optimal problem is that sometimes consumers can commit
to how much product information to acquire, or use, before rms make their pricing decisions. For
instance, a consumer could strategically delegate her purchase decision to an agent (e.g., a purchasing
alliance) who commits to focus more on price than other product characteristics in order to stimulate
price competition among suppliers.
4It is well known that the posterior (expected) consumer valuation distribution induced by any
signal structure is a mean-preserving contraction of the underlying prior distribution. However, unlike
the scalar case, a multidimensional mean-preserving contraction has no simple characterization as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). See, for example, section 7.2 of Dworczak and Martini (2019) for
discussion of this point.
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prices when any valuation distribution is allowed.
In our information design problem, however, only some of the posterior valuation
distributions can be induced by signal structures. Using the bounds approach, we
show in section 3.2 for both rms and consumers that any asymmetric signal structure
which treats the two rms di¤erently is dominated by a symmetric signal structure.
Surprisingly, this is true even for an individual rm, i.e., the rm which is favored by
an asymmetric signal will prefer some symmetric signal structure which treats it and
its rival the same. Intuitively, when a rm is treated unfavorably with asymmetric
signals, it has an incentive to set a low price. Our result shows that this force can be
su¢ ciently strong so that even the favored rm su¤ers from this erce competition.
This result suggests that rms have congruent interests when it comes to the design
of consumer information, and biased recommendationsare not the best approach to
improve prot within this framework.
The bounds are used in sections 3.3 and 3.4 to characterize the rm-optimal or the
consumer-optimal information policy (which must be symmetric). The rm-optimal
signal structure amplies perceivedproduct di¤erentiation in order to relax competi-
tion, and does so by reducing the likelihood that consumers ex post are near-indi¤erent
between products. Compared to full information disclosure, the rm-optimal infor-
mation policy can signicantly improve industry prot. This suggests that providing
consumers with more product information need not raise rmsmarket power. The
rm-optimal policy usually enables consumers to buy their preferred product for sure,
in which case total welfare is also maximized.
The consumer-optimal signal structure by contrast dampens perceived product
di¤erentiation in order to stimulate competition, and does so by increasing the number
of consumers who are near-indi¤erent between products. In the consumer-optimal pol-
icy, a consumer with strong preferences can buy her preferred product for sure, but a
less choosy consumer receives less precise information and may end up with the inferior
product. Thus, in contrast to the rm-optimal policy, the consumer-optimal policy
does not maximize total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy usually induces rather
low market prices, suggesting that for information design with only two rms the price
competition e¤ect tends to outweigh the match quality e¤ect for consumers.
In section 3.5 we characterize the welfare frontier when the information environment
consumers face is exible. Any prot between zero and the rm-optimal prot level is
feasible. For a given prot level, the e¢ cient frontier is achievable if the prot is no
less than the prot under full disclosure; otherwise, mismatch is needed to induce erce
competition, in which case the e¢ cient frontier is not achievable. This welfare frontier
can be used to solve the Ramsey problem, i.e., the optimal information policy which
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maximizes a weighted sum of industry prot and consumer surplus.
In section 4 we discuss several extensions to this analysis. First, the outside option
becomes relevant for the analysis if valuations for the products are relatively dispersed ex
ante. Optimal information design in such a case is a hard problem in general. However,
if valuations are su¢ ciently dispersed, we show that the ranksignal structure, which
informs consumers which product they prefer but nothing else, allows rms to obtain
rst-best prot, in which case the outside option binds for all consumers. The rank
structure eliminates consumers who are near-indi¤erent between products, and with
su¢ ciently dispersed preferences, it is an equilibrium for rms to charge consumers their
(expected) valuation of the preferred product. Second, we explore whether considering
the wider class of signals which allow mixed strategy pricing equilibria can improve
outcomes. We show that allowing symmetric mixed strategy equilibria could at best
improve consumer surplus only slightly. Third, we consider markets with more than two
rms. There we show that the top productsignal structure which informs consumers
of their most preferred product but nothing else can sometimes enable rms to achieve
the rst-best outcome, and even if it does not achieve rst-best prot, the same signal
structure bounds industry prot away from zero regardless of the number of rms.
When there are many rms, the top twosignal structure which informs consumers
of their best two products (but without ranking them) can approximately achieve the
rst-best outcome for consumers: it induces marginal-cost pricing, and the sacrice of
match quality when consumers buy one of the best two products is negligible with many
rms. With many rms full information disclosure can also approximately achieve the
rst-best for consumers, but it is dominated by the top-two structure for a nite number
of rms.
As with many other optimal policies in economics, the optimal information policies
derived in this paper might be too complicatedto implement in practice. Neverthe-
less, these optimal policies provide useful guidance for which kinds of informations help
boost prots and which help consumers. To relax competition and improve prot, we
need to reduce the number of price-sensitive consumers who are near-indi¤erent be-
tween (the best two) products. A simple information policy to do so is the rank or the
top-product signal structure. To improve consumer welfare, we want to induce a erce
competition but at the same time not cause too much product mismatch. A simple
information policy which can serve this purpose is the top-two signal structure.
Related literature. One strand of the relevant literature considers a monopolists
incentive to provide information to enable consumers to discover their valuation for its
product. An early paper on this topic is Lewis and Sappington (1994). They study a
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monopoly market and show, within the class of truth or noisesignal structures, how it
is optimal for the rm either to disclose no information or all information. Johnson and
Myatt (2006) derive a similar result for a more general class of information structures
which induce rotations of the demand curve. Anderson and Renault (2006) argue that
partial information disclosure before consumers search can be optimal for a monopolist
if consumers need to pay a search cost to buy the product (in which case they learn
their valuation automatically). Importantly, they allow for general signal structures
as in the later Bayesian persuasion literature and show that rm-optimal information
disclosure takes the coarse form whereby a consumer is informed merely whether her
valuation lies above a threshold.
Roesler and Szentes (2017) study the signal structure which is best for consumers
(rather than the rm) in a monopoly model. They show that the optimal signal struc-
ture can be found within the class of posterior distributions which induce unit-elastic
demand functions. (These unit-elastic demand functions play a similar role to the pos-
terior distribution bounds in our analysis.) They show that partial rather than complete
learning is optimal for consumers, and that the optimal information structure induces
ex ante e¢ cient trade and maximizes total welfare.5 In their setup, where trade is
always e¢ cient, the rm-optimal signal structure is to disclose no information at all, in
which case the rm can extract all surplus by charging a price equal to the expected
valuation. With competition, however, this is no longer true since without any infor-
mation consumers regard the rmsproducts as perfect substitutes and rms earn zero
prot. (Indeed in our duopoly model we show that disclosing no information is nearly
optimal for consumers, rather than rms.) Therefore, the rm-oriented problem is more
interesting and challenging in our setting with competition than it is with monopoly.
With competition, the consumer-optimal policy also exhibits some signicant di¤er-
ences with the monopoly case in Roesler and Szentes. For example, it usually causes
product mismatch so that the allocation is sometimes ine¢ cient, the induced residual
demand for each rm is unit-elastic for upward but not downward price deviations, and
the consumer-optimal signal structure is not the least protable policy for rms.
Our paper concerns information design in an oligopoly setting. Most of the previous
research on this topic studies the decentralizeddisclosure policies of individual rms.
For example, Ivanov (2013) studies competitive disclosure when each rm decides how
5Condorelli and Szentes (2020) study the related problem of how to choose the demand curve
to maximize consumer surplus, given the monopolist chooses its price optimally in response. (The
consumer accurately observes her realized valuation in this model.) Choi, Kim, and Pease (2019)
extend Roesler and Szentes (2017) to the set-up of Anderson and Renault (2006), and derive the
consumer-optimal policy in the context of a search good.
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much information about its own product to release and what price to charge. He focuses
on information structures which rotate demand as in Johnson and Myatt (2006), and
shows that full disclosure is the only symmetric equilibrium when the number of rms
goes to innity.6 Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky (2020) show that the same result
holds if general signal structures are allowed (and more generally are able to show
that increasing the number of rms induces each rm to reveal more information).
Intuitively, with many rms, a consumers valuation for the best rival product (if other
rms fully disclose their information) is high. To compete for the consumer, a rm
discloses all information as that is the policy which maximizes the posterior probability
she has a high valuation.7
Instead of studying equilibrium disclosure by individual rms, though, we focus on
a centralizeddesign problem, such as when a platform mediates the information ow
from products to consumers. This enables us to discuss signals which reect relative
valuations across products, e.g., which rank the products for consumers. This more
general signal structure introduces a number of additional features. In our framework,
for instance, full information disclosure is not the rm-optimal design even with many
rms, and the rank policy sometimes yields rst-best prot for rms (which can never
be achieved with a decentralized design). In addition, when decentralized signals are
not fully revealing, there are welfare losses since consumers sometimes choose a less
preferred product, while with a centralized structure it is possible to have a coarse
signal structure (e.g., the rank signal) which maintains e¢ ciency. Finally, Hwang et al.
(2020) show that the equilibrium price (and hence prot) often falls relative to the full-
information price when individual rms choose their disclosure policy non-cooperatively,
while by construction the centralized rm-optimal policy must boost prot.
Other papers have also studied centralizedaspects of the design of consumer in-
formation. Anderson and Renault (2009) study comparative advertising in a duopoly
model where each rm unilaterally chooses between fully disclosing its own product
information, fully disclosing information about both products, or disclosing nothing.
Among other results, they make the point that disclosing more information improves
match quality but also softens price competition. Jullien and Pavan (2019) make a sim-
ilar point when they study how platformsinformation management a¤ects their com-
6Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2012) study competitive product design within a sequential search
market. They consider designs which rotate demand, and show that a reduction in the search cost in-
duces more rms to choose niche product design (which can be interpreted as full information disclosure
in the context of information design when consumers have a common prior).
7A similar result appears in other recent works which study competitive disclosure but without
price competition, such as Board and Lu (2018).
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petition in two-sided markets. Both papers consider specic classes of signal structures.
When general signal structures are allowed, as we show in this paper, the monotonic
relationship between the amount of information and the degree of price competition
fails. Dogan and Hu (2019) study the consumer-optimal disclosure policy in a sequen-
tial search framework with many rms. Consumers receive a signal of their valuation for
a particular product only when they visit its seller. The information policy is chosen by
a third party, and the disclosure is only about each individual product (and so there is
no disclosure about relative valuations across products). Because the reservation value
in this search framework is static, their problem is similar to the monopoly problem
studied by Roesler and Szentes (2017). Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) study a duopoly
model of price competition similar to ours, where the consumer receives a private signal
of her relative valuation for the two products. A major di¤erence, however, is that they
assume the relative valuation is binary and the signal is binary as well and is further
symmetric across states. In that simple setting, they can allow rms to be ex ante
asymmetric, but the pricing equilibrium often involves complicated mixed strategies.8
Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) also point out that both rm prot and consumer wel-
fare can vary non-monotonically with the amount of information consumers have, but
they do not explicitly study the optimal signal structure for rms or consumers.
More broadly, our paper belongs to the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion
and information design. See Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for a pioneering paper
in this literature, and Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Kamenica (2019) for recent
surveys. Among its many applications, its method and insights have been used to revisit
classic problems within Industrial Organization. For instance, Bergemann, Brooks, and
Morris (2015) study third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist. In contrast to
the consumer-side design problem in Roesler and Szentes (2017) and our model, their
paper considers a rm-side design problem where signals are sent to the rm about
consumer preferences, and consumers accurately know their valuation from the start.
A given signal structure corresponds to a particular partition of consumers. If all ways
to partition consumers are possible, the paper shows that any combination of prot
(above the no-discrimination benchmark) and consumer surplus which sum to no more
than maximum total welfare can be implemented. Elliot, Galeotti, and Koh (2020)
extend Bergemann et al. to the competition case with product di¤erentiation, and
derive conditions under which market segmentation through information can earn rms
8When we study the top productsignal structure in section 4.3, the resulting posterior valuation
distribution is binary. There we construct the mixed strategy pricing equilibrium similarly as in
Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) but with an arbitrary number of rms. Beyond the binary case, it is
generally intractable to study mixed strategy pricing equilibrium with product di¤erentiation.
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the rst-best prot. Li (2020) solves the consumer-optimal problem in the competition
case by applying the segmentation idea in Bergemann et al. to each submarket where
there is a dominant rm which is preferred by all consumers there.9
2 The model
A risk-neutral consumer wishes to buy a single unit of a di¤erentiated product which
is costlessly supplied by two risk-neutral rms, 1 and 2. The consumers valuation for
the unit from rm i = 1; 2 is denoted vi  0. The consumer is initially uncertain
about her valuations and holds a prior belief about the joint distribution of (v1; v2).
Throughout the paper we assume that rms are symmetric ex ante, in the sense that
the prior distribution for (v1; v2) is symmetric between v1 and v2. We assume that
the support of the prior distribution lies inside the square [V; V + 1]2. Here, V  0
represents the basic utility from either product, while 1 is the normalized range of
product valuations. Let   E[vi] denote the expected valuation of either product (or
a random product).
The consumer has an outside option which is sure to have payo¤ zero. Until section
4.1, however, we assume this outside option is irrelevant and the consumer always
purchases one of the two products. (As shown in Lemma 3 in the appendix, this is the
case if the basic utility V is su¢ ciently high and we restrict attention to pure strategy
pricing equilibrium.) In this case the consumer cares only about the di¤erence in her
valuations, x  v1   v2, and so consumer heterogeneity becomes one-dimensional. Let
F (x) be the prior distribution for x which is symmetric around 0 and has support in
[ 1; 1].
Before purchase the consumer observes a private signal of x. The signal is generated
according to a signal structure f(sjx); Sg, where S is the signal space and (sjx)
species the distribution of signal s when the true preference parameter is x. We
assume the signal structure is common knowledge to the consumer and to both rms,
and determined before rms choose prices. This assumption is plausible when the signal
structure is publicly chosen by some third-party such as a platform or a regulator as a
relatively long-term decision. After observing signal s, the consumer updates her belief
9Similar problems are also studied in the Varian (1980) setup where rms supply a homogeneous
product but each rm has some captive consumers who know only one rm. See, e.g., Armstrong
and Vickers (2019), Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2020), and Shi and Zhang (2020). In many
circumstances, market segmentation also depends on how much preference information consumers are
willing to share with rms. See, e.g., Ali, Lewis, and Vasserman (2019) and Ichihashi (2020) for
relevant works which consider general information structures.
9
about her relative preference x to, say, Fs(x). Given the consumer is risk neutral, only
the expected x given s, EFs [x], matters for her choice. Let G(x) be the distribution
of this expected x, and we refer to it as the consumers posterior distribution. It is
jointly determined by the prior distribution for x and the signal structure. Even though
some signal structures may be hard to implement in practical terms, this approach is a
general way to model the consumers information environment and enables us to explore
the limits of competition when information is fully exible.10
Firms know the consumers prior and the signal structure, and hence know the
posterior distribution G(x), but they do not observe her private signal, and so they
each choose a single price regardless of the signal received by the consumer. We assume
that prices are always accurately observed by the consumer. If pi is rm is price,
then the consumer prefers to buy from rm 1 if her expected x after seeing a signal
satises x > p1   p2, prefers to buy from rm 2 if x < p1   p2 (and is indi¤erent when
x = p1   p2). Firms set prices simultaneously to maximize their expected prot, and
we use Bertrand-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for the pricing game.
We aim to investigate how the signal structure a¤ects competition and the ability
of the consumer to buy her preferred product. In particular, we search for those signal
structures which maximize industry prot and those which maximize consumer surplus.
As discussed in the introduction, for tractability we focus on those signal structures
which induce a pure strategy pricing equilibrium. (We will discuss signal structures
which might induce mixed strategy equilibria in section 4.2.)
2.1 Examples of signals
It is useful initially to consider some simple signal structures. To illustrate these, assume
here that the prior distribution is uniform, so F (x) = 1
2
(1 + x).
Full information disclosure: Here the signal perfectly reveals the true preference x, e.g.,
where s  x, and so the posterior and prior distributions for x coincide. The equilibrium
price is then 1, which is also industry prot (given full consumer participation). The
consumer always buys her preferred product, which maximizes total welfare, but the
10One interpretation of the signal structure in our setup is that an information designer (e.g., a
platform) might know a consumers preferences (e.g., due to its past interactions with the consumer)
and can send the consumer a signal contingent on those preferences (e.g., personalized recommen-
dations), but it commits to the signal structure before seeing the consumers preferences. The more
standard, also less informationally demanding, interpretation from the Bayesian persuasion literature
is that the signal structure is an information experimentation device, and even consumers with the
same preferences may learn di¤erent noisy signals from the same information environment.
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market price is relatively high. The consumers expected surplus is (+ 1
4
) 1 =   3
4
,
where  is the expected match utility of a random product, and 1
4
= EF [maxfx; 0g] is
the match e¢ ciency improvement under full information disclosure relative to random
purchase.
No information disclosure: In this case the signal is completely uninformative (i.e., the
distribution of s does not depend on x) and the posterior G is degenerate at x = 0.
In particular, the consumer views the two products as perfect substitutes. Both the
equilibrium price and industry prot are 0, and consumer surplus is simply  since
the consumer buys a product randomly in equilibrium. This consumer surplus is higher
than that under full information disclosure, and so the disutility she incurs from buying
a random product is outweighed by the low equilibrium price she pays. (As we will see
in section 4.3, when there are more than two rms, the top-two signal structure which
informs consumers of their best two products but without ranking them can achieve
the same pricing outcome but without causing too much product mismatch.)
Truth or ranksignal : Here the signal accurately informs the consumer of her x with
probability  < 1 and otherwise only informs her whether x > 0 or x < 0 (i.e., which
product she prefers). (Suppose the rank signals are distinguishable from the truth







at each) and is otherwise the same as the prior but with a reduced density

2
. In this case, if  is su¢ ciently close to 1 (so the two mass points do not carry too
much weight), a symmetric equilibrium price exists and is equal to 1

> 1, and so rms
earn more than they did under full disclosure.11 (Consumer surplus, however, is lower
than with full disclosure because in either case the consumer always buys her preferred
product.)
The rst two of these examples illustrate the consumers trade-o¤ between match
quality and the intensity of competition, and how the latter e¤ect can dominate. The
rst and third examples suggest that one way to soften competition and enhance in-
dustry prot is to reduce the chance that the consumer is indi¤erent between the two
products, and more information for consumers is not always associated with more mar-
ket power of rms. The three examples together imply that full information disclosure
11This is the case if   3  
p
5  0:76. If  is below the threshold, the incentive for each rm to
undercut and steal the rivals consumers on the mass points becomes so strong that there is no pure
strategy equilibrium. When  = 0, we have the pure rank signal structure which has independent
interest and which will be discussed in section 4.
11
is optimal neither for rms nor for the consumer. As we will see in section 4.3, these
insights carry over to the case when there are more than two rms.
All these signal structures are symmetric in the sense that they induce a symmetric
posteriorG. More generally, as shown in this nal example, a signal structure can induce
an asymmetric posterior and make ex ante symmetric products appear asymmetric.
Truth or biased recommendationsignal : Modify the previous example so that when
the consumer is not provided with full information she learns whether x > b or x < b
for some b 2 (0; 1). (An interpretation is that rm 1s product is recommended if x > b
and otherwise rm 2s product is recommended.) The posterior now has a mass point
with mass 1
2
(1   )(b + 1) at 1
2
(b   1) and a mass point with mass 1
2
(1   )(1   b) at
1
2
(b + 1). One can check that given b 2 (0; 1), if  is su¢ ciently close to 1 there is an




where   b
3
(1  ) > 0. Compared to the symmetric case with b = 0, the favored rm
2 raises its price while rm 1 lowers its price. Firm 2s equilibrium market share rises
to 1
2
(1 + ) and rm 1s falls to 1
2
(1   ), and so the biased recommendation helps
rm 2 but harms rm 1. Industry prot is 1

(1 + 2), which is even greater than in
the symmetric case. (The consumer then must su¤er from this biased recommendation
as it harms match e¢ ciency and total welfare.) This nal example suggests that the
use of asymmetric signals might be a useful tool to improve industry prot. However,
as we will see in section 3.2, this turns out not to be possible once we consider general
signal structures.
2.2 Preliminaries
To study more general signal structures we use the following well-known results to
simplify the problem. For a given prior F , the only restriction on the posterior G
imposed by Bayesian consistency is that it is a mean-preserving contraction (MPC) of





F (~x)d~x for x 2 [ 1; 1], with equality at x = 1 : (1)
Moreover, any G which is an MPC of F can be generated by means of some signal
structure.12 Therefore, instead of analyzing the signal structure directly, we can work
with the posterior distribution G and look for a posterior which is optimal for rms or
12See, for example, Blackwell (1953), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016),
and Roesler and Szentes (2017).
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consumers subject only to the MPC constraint (1). Figure 1 depicts some examples of
MPCs of the uniform prior (where the dashed line represents the uniform prior CDF
















Figure 1: Some examples of MPCs
The following two observations will be useful: First, when G is symmetric, the





F (~x)d~x for x 2 [ 1; 0] (2)
is su¢ cient for G to be an MPC of F . Second, if a symmetric G further crosses F at







is su¢ cient for G to be an MPC of F .
We also need a measure of the e¢ ciency of product choice corresponding to a pos-
terior G. If the consumer always chooses her preferred product (i.e., chooses product 1
if the expected x is positive and product 2 otherwise, as would be the case if the two
rms o¤ered the same price), total surplus is




where the equality follows after integration by parts and uses the fact that G has a
zero mean (which implies
R 1
 1G(x)dx = 1). Since  is the expected value of a random
product, the integral term reects the match e¢ ciency improvement under posterior G
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relative to no information disclosure. (Note that this observation does not need G to
be symmetric.)
Dene
  EF [ maxfx; 0g] =
Z 0
 1
F (x)dx : (5)
This parameter  captures the underlying extent of product di¤erentiation in the mar-
ket. Since G is an MPC of F , condition (1) at x = 0 implies that (4) cannot exceed
the maximum total surplus  + . In other words, match e¢ ciency cannot increase
when the consumer observes a noisy signal of her preferences, as is intuitive. When the
inequality (3) is strict as in Figures 1a and 1c mismatch occurs with the posterior
G. There is no product mismatch when there is equality in (3). This is the case under
full disclosure, and more generally when the consumer is fully informed about whether
x > 0 or x < 0, even though she may not be fully informed about the magnitude of x.
3 Optimal signal structures
We derive the rm and consumer optimal signal structures in two steps. First, we
ignore the MPC constraint (1) and derive the constraints on G needed to implement
a target pair of prices (p1; p2) in pure strategy equilibrium. Second, we search for the
prices, together with their supporting G, which are optimal for rms or the consumer,
subject to the constraint that G is an MPC of F .
3.1 Bounds on posteriors
In this section we derive bounds on the distributions G(x) which implement a given pair
of prices (p1; p2) in pure strategy equilibrium. The analysis here is separate from the






















(When both prices are zero, we stipulate that i = 0 in (8).) The following lemma
shows that these functions are the required bounds on G.
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Lemma 1 (i) A distribution G implements (p1; p2) as equilibrium prices if and only if
Lp1;p2(x)  G(x)  Up1;p2(x) (9)
for all x 2 [ 1; 1], where the two bounds are dened in (6) and (7) and i in (8) is rm
is equilibrium prot; furthermore p1 = p2 > 0 if and only if G(0) = 12 .
(ii) (p1; p2) can be equilibrium prices under some G if and only if pj   1  i for i 6= j
(which implies jpi   pjj  1 and pi  2).
The two bounds Lp1;p2 and Up1;p2 arise from each rms no-deviation requirement
for equilibrium. They are illustrated in Figure 2 below. (The dashed line in each plot



















(c) p1 > p2
Figure 2: Bounds on G to implement pure strategy equilibrium prices
The lower bound Lp1;p2 increases with x and begins to be positive at x = 1 p2 (which
exceeds  1 given p2   1  1), and it is concave whenever it is positive. The upper
bound Up1;p2 also increases with x and reaches 1 at x = p1  2 (which is below 1 given
p1   1  2), and it is convex whenever it is less than 1. The two bounds coincide and
have the same slope at x = p1   p2.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 says that for a distribution G to induce a pair of equilibrium
prices (p1; p2), we only need it to be between the two associated bounds, and in par-
ticular G can be irregular (e.g., the distribution can have atoms). But G has to be
smooth at x = p1   p2 given the two bounds are tangent to each other at that point.
(This is intuitive because if G has an atom at x = p1   p2, a rm obtains a discrete
jump in demand if it slightly undercuts its rival, in which case (p1; p2) cannot be an
equilibrium.) In Figure 2a, we have G(0) > 1
2
for any G above the lower bound, i.e., it
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is more likely that the consumer prefers rm 2s product, and that is why rm 2 sets a
higher price; the opposite is true in Figure 2c.
From the equilibrium prot expression (8), rm is equilibrium market share is
pi=(p1+p2). Hence, both equilibrium prots and market shares are determined entirely
by equilibrium prices and do not depend separately on the shape of G, and the rm
with the higher equilibrium price necessarily has the higher market share and the higher
prot. Part (i) also shows that if the distribution is symmetric and induces a pure
strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium prices must be symmetric. (Notice, however, that
an asymmetric distribution can also induce symmetric equilibrium prices if G(0) = 1
2
.)
Using the bounds result in part (i), part (ii) of Lemma 1 characterizes the set of
possible pure strategy equilibrium prices when G can be any distribution on [ 1; 1].
This range is depicted as the shaded area in Figure 3a. In particular, the highest
possible pure strategy equilibrium price for either rm is 2. Using part (ii), one can
also derive all possible pairs of prots (1; 2) as described in Figure 3b. It is clear that
the best outcome for each rm is the symmetric outcome with p1 = p2 = 2 in which case
each earns prot 1. This suggests that rms have congruent interests when it comes to
jointly choosing the valuation distribution (e.g., via joint product design). No rm will
be happy with an asymmetric distribution even if it is favored and earns more than its
rival. As we will see in next section, a similar result holds when we consider information
design in which case not all (posterior) valuation distributions are available due to the
MPC constraint.






(a) prices (p1; p2)







(b) prots (1; 2)
Figure 3: Set of possible pure strategy equilibrium outcomes
The symmetric case p1 = p2 = p, shown on Figure 2b, is important in our subsequent
















As indicated on Figure 2b above, these bounds are mirror images of each other, in the
sense that Lp(x)  1   Up( x). Therefore, if a symmetric G lies between the bounds
in the negative range x 2 [ 1; 0], it will lie between the bounds over the whole range
[ 1; 1]. A useful property of the two bounds (10) and (11) is that they rotate clockwise
about the point (0; 1
2
) as p increases, and in particular both of them increase with p
for x < 0. Intuitively, to induce a higher price we need fewer price-sensitive consumers
around x = 0, which requires the bounds to be atter.
In the following, we often consider the case when the market has a pure strategy
pricing equilibrium in the benchmark with full disclosure. Lemma 1 implies that this
is the case if and only if the (symmetric) prior distribution F lies between the bounds
Lp and Up for some p. Since the two bounds are tangent to each other at x = 0, F
must be di¤erentiable at that point and let f(0) be the corresponding density. Then
the symmetric equilibrium price under full information is pF = 1=(2f(0)).
Condition 1 F lies between the bounds LpF and UpF with pF = 1=(2f(0)).
The oligopoly literature often invokes one of the following stronger conditions to
ensure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium:
Condition 2 (i) 1  F is log-concave on [ 1; 0], and (ii) F is log-concave on [ 1; 0].
Condition 3 F has density f which is log-concave on [ 1; 1].
It is well known (see, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)) that Condition 3 implies
that both 1   F and F are log-concave on [ 1; 1], and hence Condition 2. Using the
observation that Up and 1 Lp are log-convex whenever they are less than one, one can
also see that Condition 2 implies Condition 1.13 We will use some of these conditions
in parts of the following analysis.
13Notice that at x = 0, both UpF and F equal
1
2 and have the same slope f(0). Then, if F is log-
concave on [ 1; 0], we have F  UpF over that range given the upper bound is log-convex. Similarly,
when 1  F is log-concave on [ 1; 0], using the fact that 1 Lp is log-convex whenever Lp is positive,
we can also see that F  LpF over that range. Therefore, Condition 2 implies that F lies between LpF
and UpF .
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3.2 The suboptimality of asymmetric posteriors
In the example with biased recommendations in section 2.1, we saw that relative to
certain symmetric signals, asymmetric signals which favor one rm over the other can
improve industry prot and the favored rms prot. We show using Lemma 1 that
this insight does not continue to apply when general signal structures are allowed.
Lemma 2 For each rm or the consumer, an asymmetric posterior which induces a
pure strategy equilibrium is dominated by a symmetric posterior which also induces a
pure strategy equilibrium. (The dominance is strict if the asymmetric posterior induces
asymmetric prices.)
The result concerning rms states that even if a rm earns more than its rival under
an asymmetric posterior, it will nevertheless prefer some symmetric posterior. Since
a symmetric posterior induces a symmetric equilibrium, both rms then are better o¤
and so industry prot improves. This implies that similar to the case in the previous
section where there was no information constraint, rms have congruent interests when
it comes to the design of consumer information. Intuitively, when a rm is treated
unfavorably under an asymmetric signal structure, it has an incentive to set a low
price. Lemma 2 shows that this force can be su¢ ciently strong so that even the favored
rm su¤ers from the resulting erce competition. This suggests regardless of whether a
designer (e.g., a platform) wants to maximize industry prot or one rms prot (e.g.,
the prot of the platforms own product), biased recommendationsachieved through
asymmetric signals may not be the best approach.
For the consumer, asymmetric signal structures result in mismatch (due to both
biased information and price dispersion). This negative e¤ect on the consumer turns
out to outweigh the potential benet from lower prices in an asymmetric market.
Using Lemma 2, in the following we restrict our attention to symmetric posteriors
when we derive the rm or consumer optimal solution.
3.3 Firm-optimal policy
Since we can restrict attention to symmetric posteriors and symmetric prices, and
since there is full consumer participation, maximizing industry prot corresponds to
maximizing the symmetric equilibrium price p. We therefore wish to nd the highest p
such that there exists a G lying between Lp in (10) and Up in (11) which is an MPC of
the prior F . Notice that, whenever a symmetric G is a solution to this problem which
induces price p, a symmetric posterior which takes the form Lp for negative x (and so
18
takes the form Up for positive x) must be a solution as well.14 Therefore, we can restrict
attention to symmetric posteriors which take the form Lp for negative x.
We illustrate our approach by considering the uniform-prior example with F (x) =
1
2
(1+x). As on Figure 2b, given that Lp is concave whenever it is positive, it crosses the
linear prior at most once and from below in the range of negative x. Then according





 1 F (x)dx =
1
4
. Since Lp increases with p for negative x, the

















2(1  log 2)  1:63 :
This optimal price is about 63% higher than the full-information price pF = 1 in this
example. The optimal symmetric posterior equals Lp for negative x, and the way we
derive the optimal price also implies that this is the unique optimal solution.15 Notice
also that (3) holds with equality when G = Lp, and so the rm-optimal posterior leads
to perfect matching and so maximizes total welfare. (The consumer does not possess
full information, but she has enough information always to buy her preferred product.)
This argument continues to hold provided that for each p, Lp crosses F at most once
and from below in the range of negative x. This is true, for instance, when F is convex
for negative x (or the density f is weakly single-peaked at x = 0). More generally, we
have the following result:




1  log 2 ; (12)
where  is dened in (5), and it is uniquely implemented by the symmetric posterior
which is equal to Lp in the range of negative x, where Lp is dened in (10). With the







 1 F (~x)d~x for x 2 [ 1; 0], where the rst inequal-
ity is because Lp is the lower bound of G and the second is because G is an MPC of F . Therefore,
according to (2) a symmetric posterior which equals Lp for negative x must be an MPC of F .
15If there is another posterior which induces the same price p but di¤ers from Lp on a positive
measure of x < 0, then it must violate the MPC constraint.
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The rm-optimal posterior distribution depends on the prior only through . (A
prior with a higher  leads to a higher optimal price and so a atter posterior.) Figure
4 illustrates the optimal posterior with a uniform prior (where the dashed lines are the
prior density and CDF, respectively). In particular, the density is U-shaped. Intuitively,
to soften price competition we reduce the number of consumers around x = 0, as these
consumers are the most price sensitive, and push consumers towards the two extremes











Figure 4: Firm-optimal posterior
The uniform example shows how the rm-optimal policy can signicantly improve
prot compared to the simple benchmark of full disclosure, and so giving more infor-
mation to consumers does not always lead to greater market power for rms. More
generally, with a log-concave prior density rms can achieve prot at least 63% higher
than with full disclosure. The following result provides more details.
Corollary 1 Under Condition 3, the rm-optimal price in (12) satises pF  p 
2pF where  = 12(1 log 2)  1:63.
This result also shows that the advantage of considering general signal structures,
relative to some frequently-used signal structures, can be signicant. For instance,
the often-used truth-or-noisestructure (whereby the signal s is equal to the true x
with some probability and otherwise the signal is a random realization of x) induces a
degree of mismatch so that consumers become more concentrated around x = 0, and so
16With this posterior distribution, when a rm, say, rm 2 deviates to a price lower than p, its
residual demand takes the form of the upper bound and so is unit-elastic (i.e., its prot is unchanged),
since the upper bound was derived from rm 2s no deviation condition. While if it deviates to a price
higher than p, its demand takes the form of the lower bound and so its prot strictly falls.
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it cannot enhance prot relative to the full-information policy. The same is true more
generally when the distribution for x is rotatedabout x = 0 as studied by Johnson
and Myatt (2006). Therefore, the use of unrestricted signal structures, which allow
consumers to buy their preferred product, enables rms to do at least 63% better than
they could with those more restricted signals.
Discussion: For more general priors than those covered by Proposition 1, the rm-





F (x)dx for ~x 2 [ 1; 0] :
In general, however, Lp and F can cross multiple times in the range of negative x, in
which case it becomes somewhat harder to solve for the optimal price. Moreover, (3)
might hold strictly and so there could be welfare loss associated with the rm-optimal
signal structure. Figure 5 illustrates both points, where the prior shown as the dashed
curve is initially convex and then concave in the range of negative x. The highest price
such that Lp is an MPC of the prior is shown as the solid curve, where the integrals of
the two curves up to the crossing point a are equal (so with any higher price the MPC
constraint would be violated). Here, since Lp lies below the prior for x above a, (3)







Figure 5: Firm-optimal posterior with a less regular prior
Notice also that if the prior distribution is so dispersed that the MPC constraint
never binds (e.g., when the prior distribution is binary at x =  1 and 1), our bounds
analysis in section 3.1 implies that the highest possible (pure strategy) prot 2 is achiev-
able. Beyond the information design problem, this observation is relevant, for example,




We turn next to the optimal information policy for the consumer. Unlike rms, the
consumer does not care solely about the induced price but also about the reliability of
the product match. When a posterior G induces a symmetric equilibrium with price
p, the consumer always buys her ex post preferred product, so from (4) we know that
her expected surplus is   p+
R 0
 1G(x)dx. To maximize this, we rst nd the highest
possible G to maximize match e¢ ciency
R 0
 1G(x)dx for a given price p, subject to the
bounds condition Lp  G  Up and the MPC constraint, and then identify the optimal
price.
We illustrate our approach by considering the uniform-prior example again. For
the consumer to do better than with full information disclosure (in which case the
equilibrium price is pF = 1), the induced price must be below 1 to counteract any
potential product mismatch. Then the associated bounds must be steep enough at
x = 0 so that they lie below the prior CDF for x close to zero. This is illustrated in
Figure 6a below, where the two bold curves are the two bounds in the range of negative
x. Since we want G to be as high as possible, it is now the upper bound Up which
will constrain G, rather than the lower bound which was relevant for the rm-optimal
policy. Since the upper bound is convex, for any price p < 1 the upper bound cuts the




















Figure 6: Consumer-optimal G for given price p
Therefore, for a given price p < 1, a consumer-optimal (symmetric) G is simply
G(x) = minfF (x); Up(x)g (13)
for negative x, as shown as the bold curve in Figure 6b. First, this G is clearly between
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the two bounds associated with price p and is also an MPC of the prior.17 Second, for
x 2 [xp; 0], this G already equals the upper bound; for x < xp, this G equals F and soR xp
 1 G(x)dx already reaches its maximum given the MPC constraint.
Notice, however, for x < xp, the consumer-optimal G can take other forms provided




 1 F (x)dx. Figure 6c
depicts one alternative solution. It is also clear that for any consumer-optimal G, the
strict inequality of (3) must hold because G is below F for x 2 [xp; 0]. Therefore,
in contrast to the rm-optimal solution, there must be welfare losses at the consumer
optimum and the consumer sometimes buys her less preferred product.





minfF (x); Up(x)gdx  p : (14)
One can check that the derivative of (14) with respect to p is 1
2
(p   log p   3) when
F is uniform, which decreases with p in the range [0; 1]. Then the optimal price is
p  0:05 which is the root of p  log p = 3 in the range [0; 1], and a consumer-optimal
symmetric posterior is given by expression (13) with p = p for negative x.
The above argument continues to hold if for each price p < pF , the upper bound Up
crosses F once and from above in the range of negative x. This is true, for example,
when F is concave. More generally, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Under Conditions 1 and 2(ii), a consumer-optimal signal structure in-







where   0:05 is the root of   log  = 3 in the range [0; 1], and it can be implemented
by a symmetric posterior which is equal to minfF (x); Up(x)g in the range of negative
x, where Up is dened in (11). With the consumer-optimal signal structure there is
mismatch and total welfare is not maximized.
(Here Condition 1 is needed to ensure that the full-information benchmark has a pure
strategy equilibrium price pF , so the argument that the consumer-optimal price must
be below pF continues to hold.)
Figure 7 depicts the consumer-optimal posterior distribution when the prior is uni-
form (and when the posterior takes the particular form in Figure 6b). The number
17Note that at the full information price pF we have LpF  F , and so Lp < F for negative x when
p < pF given the lower bound increases in price for negative x. Hence, for any price p < pF , (13) must
be above Lp.
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of price-sensitive consumers near x = 0 is amplied compared with the prior distribu-
tion, and this forces rms to reduce their price in equilibrium. Those consumers near
x = 0 do not have strong preferences about which product they buy, and so there is
only limited welfare loss due to product mismatch. Those consumers with very strong













Figure 7: Consumer-optimal posterior
The uniform example has indicated that the consumer-optimal price is rather low.
This remains true more generally.
Corollary 2 Under Condition 3, the consumer-optimal price in (15) satises pF 
p  minf; 1
2
pFg where   0:05 is dened in Proposition 2.
Therefore, the insight from the previous no-disclosure example in section 2.1 is
generally true that for the consumer the price e¤ect appears more important than the
match quality e¤ect. Of course, when there are more rms, the match quality e¤ect
will become more important, and we will discuss this issue in section 4.3.
Discussion: For more general prior distributions, we can consider the family of
posteriors illustrated by Figure 6c above. Given Lemma 2, it can be shown that the
consumer-optimal policy can be implemented by a symmetric posterior which is equal
to Gmp (x) = Up(x) for x 2 [m; 0] and = 0 for x < m, where m 2 [ 1; 0] is a constant.
(This is in the spirit of Roesler and Szentes (2017).) The consumer problem is then




p (x)dx   p, subject to Gmp being an MPC of
F . It is a well-dened optimization problem, but it does not have a general analytical
solution if the upper bound Up crosses F multiple times in the range of negative x.
18In contrast to footnote 16, the consumer-optimal posterior distribution implies that when a rm
unilaterally increases its price its residual demand is unit-elastic.
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Notice also that the consumer-optimal policy is often approximated by the solution
to a simpler relaxedproblem, which is to choose a distribution G, without considering
the MPC constraint, in order to maximize equilibrium consumer surplus. Then the
consumer-optimal G for a given p is simply Up, and so the problem is to choose the
price p to maximize +
R 0
 1 Up(x)dx  p. This yields the optimal price p  0:055 which
is also rather small. This approximated solution is relevant if the prior is su¢ ciently
dispersed such that the MPC constraint never binds, or if we consider a joint product
design problem.
3.5 The welfare limits
Having discussed the signal structures which maximize prot and which maximize con-
sumer surplus, we now explore the welfare frontier in the space of prot and consumer
surplus. Let p be the rm-optimal price or industry prot. (This need not take the
form (12) if the assumption in Proposition 1 does not hold.) We know that it is imple-
mented by a symmetric posterior which equals Lp for negative x. Then any price or
industry prot p < p is feasible, since it can be implemented by a symmetric posterior
which equals Lp for negative x. (This is because Lp < Lp and so Lp is an MPC of the
prior whenever Lp is.)
To derive the welfare frontier, we need to nd the maximum possible consumer
surplus for each given industry prot p  p. Lemma 2 shows that for the consumer
any asymmetric posterior is dominated by some symmetric one (which may induce a
di¤erent industry prot). What we need here is a stronger result that for the consumer
any asymmetric posterior is dominated by a symmetric posterior which induces the
same industry prot. This turns out to be true when the prior satises the assumptions
used for Proposition 2. Once we rule out asymmetric posteriors, the analysis for the
consumer-optimal problem immediately yields the maximum possible consumer surplus
for a given price p.
Proposition 3 Any prot between 0 and p is feasible, and for a given prot p 2 [0; p],
if Conditions 1 and 2(ii) hold, the highest possible consumer surplus is + p if p  pF
and is (14), which is concave in p, if p < pF .
The bold curve in Figure 8 illustrates the welfare frontier in the uniform example,
where the two dots indicate the rm-optimal and the consumer-optimal outcomes re-
spectively. The downward sloping dashed line is the e¢ cient frontier with maximum
total welfare  +  (where for convenience we set  = 2 and  = 1
4
). Here, the full-
information price is pF = 1, and for prices above pF the feasible frontier coincides with
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the e¢ cient frontier. For lower prices, the feasible frontier lies strictly inside the e¢ cient








Figure 8: Welfare frontier
This discussion enables us to solve the Ramsey problem of maximizing a weighted
sum of prot and consumer surplus. If the weight on prot is higher than that on
consumer surplus, it is clear from Figure 8 that the solution simply coincides with the
rm-optimal policy. While, as is more usual, if the weight on consumer surplus is higher
the solution lies on the concave part of the outer frontier, where the optimal price is
below pF but above the consumer-optimal price p and is lower when the weight on
consumer surplus is greater. This also implies that full information disclosure is optimal
only in the knife edge case when we want to maximize the unweighted total welfare.
4 Extensions and discussions
We have so far focused on the situation with two rms, where the outside option never
binds for the consumer, and we restricted attention to signal structures which induce a
pure strategy pricing equilibrium. The problem without these restrictions is in general
hard to solve. In this section, we report the progress we can make when we relax these
restrictions. (The omitted proofs and details in this section are relegated to the online
appendix.)
19For a given prot p < p, the lowest value of consumer surplus is usually generated by an asym-
metric posterior. This problem appears hard to solve due to the MPC constraint, unless we focus on
symmetric posteriors (in which case we can show that the minimum consumer surplus for a given price
p is   12 (1 + log 2)p).
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4.1 Relevant outside option
In our model, the consumers valuations for the two varieties are (v1; v2) and they lie
inside [V; V + 1]2. When the outside option sometimes binds for the consumer, the
scalar parameter x = v1   v2 is no longer su¢ cient to determine consumer choice
and in general we would need to deal with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity
captured by the pair of valuations (v1; v2). As we discussed in the introduction, current
understanding of information design in such cases is limited. In particular, a mean-
preserving contraction has no simple characterization when consumer heterogeneity
is multidimensional, which prevents us solving the general two-dimensional problem.
Progress can be made, however, in the two cases when rst-best outcomes are feasible
and when consumer heterogeneity is one-dimensional.
First-best outcome is feasible: If a signal structure maximizes total surplus and allocates
all of that surplus to rms in equilibrium, then it must be optimal for rms. This is
feasible under certain conditions. Let H = E[ maxfv1; v2g] be the expected valuation
of the consumers preferred product according to the prior, and let L = E[ minfv1; v2g]
be the expected valuation of her less preferred product. (These are related by L+H =
2.) Note that H is the maximum possible welfare in the market.
Proposition 4 If
H  2L ; (16)
the rank signal structure (which only informs the consumer which product she prefers)
implements an equilibrium in which rms earn the rst-best prot.
This result is straightforward to understand. With the rank signal structure, the
posterior distribution is binary: with probability half the consumers expected valua-
tions for the two products are (H ; L), and with remaining probability her expected
valuations are (L; H). Then p1 = p2 = H is the equilibrium given condition (16),
and so rms earn the rst-best prot. (In equilibrium a rm earns 1
2
H , and if it uni-
laterally deviates to L (or slightly below), it will have the whole demand and so earn
a deviation prot L. Condition (16) ensures that such a deviation is unprotable.)
Intuitively, (16) is more likely to be satised when the valuations are more dispersed.







and so (16) is (just) satised. More generally, as shown in the online appendix,
(16) holds if v1 and v2 are independently distributed with a density which weakly
decreases over the support [0; 1].20
20If instead of duopoly the two products were jointly supplied by a multiproduct monopolist, the
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One can also consider whether there exists a signal structure which enables the
consumer to achieve her rst-best outcome. To achieve that outcome, we need p1 =
p2 = 0 in equilibrium, which in turn requires that the consumer regards the products
as perfect substitutes. In that case, she is unable to choose the preferred product
more than half the time. Consequently, it is impossible for the consumer to obtain the
rst-best surplus except in the trivial case in which the products are perfect substitutes.
One-dimensional consumer heterogeneity: Notice that given L  V and H  V + 1,
condition (16) requires V  1, i.e., the basic utility is small relative to the range of val-
uations. In other words, rms earn the rst-best prot with the rank signal structure
when consumer valuations are su¢ ciently dispersed, in which case the participation
constraint is binding. By contrast, sections 2 and 3 studied the situation where valu-
ations were su¢ ciently concentrated (V > 3 as shown in Lemma 3 in the appendix),
in which case the participation constraint was irrelevant. One way to bridge the gap
between these two situations is to consider a special case where consumer heterogeneity
is actually one-dimensional.




where x = v1   v2 2 [ 1; 1] indicates her relative preference for product 1 and each
consumers average valuation 1
2
(v1 + v2)  1 is constant. Let F be the symmetric prior
distribution for x, and let  =
R 0
 1 F (x)dx measure the dispersion of the prior distribu-
tion. The consumer will buy a product only if its net surplus is positive. In the online
appendix, we solve the optimal symmetric signal structure in this one-dimensional setup
when the prior density is log-concave, and show how the optimal policy varies with .
For example, when  is su¢ ciently low, the rm-optimal policy is the same as in section
3; when  is su¢ ciently high, the rm-optimal policy is the rank signal structure and it
earns the rst-best prot for rms; in between the optimal policy is a mixture of these
two policies.
4.2 Allowing mixed pricing strategies
It is hard to deal systematically with signal structures which induce mixed strategy
pricing equilibrium, when the bounds approach in section 3 does not apply. Instead, in
this section we derive an upper bound for consumer surplus across all symmetric signal
structures which induce a symmetric (pure or mixed strategy) equilibrium, and show
that this upper bound is close to the maximum consumer surplus available with pure
rank signal structure with associated prices p1 = p2 = H allows the rm to fully extract surplus
regardless of whether (16) holds. See Ichihashi (2020) for a related observation.
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strategies.
Consider the model introduced in section 2 with a zero outside option. The following
proposition reports the main result.
Proposition 5 Suppose V  1 and v1   v2 has a log-concave density. Then the max-
imum consumer surplus available using only pure strategies attains at least 98.4% of
the maximum consumer surplus available across all symmetric signal structures which
induce a symmetric pure or mixed strategy equilibrium.
This result demonstrates that it is not possible that consumers can do signicantly
better if the class of (symmetric) signal structures is broadened to permit mixed pricing
strategies in equilibrium. (Note, however, we have not found an example where the
use of mixed strategies improves consumer surplus at all.) Intuitively, mixed strategy
pricing usually does not intensify price competition and the resulting price dispersion
further causes product mismatch, in which case it does not benet consumers.
Ideally one would also like to obtain a tight upper bound on the prot obtained
using either pure or mixed strategies, and see how closely the optimal prot under the
pure strategy restriction approaches such an upper bound. This appears to be a harder
problem, though, and we leave it for future work.
4.3 More than two rms
We now explore the case with an arbitrary number of rms. Consider n  2 symmetric
rms, each producing a variety of a di¤erentiated product. Let v = (v1; : : : ; vn) 2 Rn+
denote the consumers valuations for the n varieties, and let F (v) be the symmetric
joint prior distribution. Before her purchase, the consumer receives a private signal of
v which is generated by a public signal structure f(sjv);Sg. Let G(v) be the joint
posterior distribution of the expected valuations after receiving the signal. As before,





any convex function  whenever the integrals exist), and any G which is an MPC of F
can be generated by some signal structure. (See, e.g., Blackwell (1953), and Strassen
(1965).) It would be interesting to know how the number of rms a¤ects optimal
information design, but this general problem is hard to solve. A full analysis would
require consideration of multi-dimensional consumer heterogeneity even in situations
where the outside option could be ignored. This invalidates both the bounds approach
and the Rothschild-Stiglitz characterization of the MPC constraint.
Here we consider two special signal structures and explore the insights from them.
A top productsignal structure informs the consumer which product is her best match
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but nothing else. In the duopoly case this is just the rank signal structure. A top
twosignal structure informs the consumer which two products are her best matches
but nothing else. In the duopoly case this corresponds to no information disclosure.
Recall   E[vi], and let n:n  E[maxfvig] denote the expected valuation for the top
product.






2n  1 ; (17)
otherwise it leads to a mixed strategy pricing equilibrium in which the industry prot is
bounded away from zero even if n!1.
(ii) Suppose the outside option is irrelevant and fvig are i.i.d. and have a common
density function which is log-concave. Both full information disclosure and the top
two signal structure asymptotically achieve the rst-best outcome for the consumer
when n!1, but the latter performs strictly better for any nite n.
Similar to the rst-best result for duopoly in section 4.1, the top productsignal




where <n:n  E[vjjvj 6= maxfvig] is the expected valuation for a non-top product.
This condition can be written as (17) by using the identity 1
n
n:n + (1   1n)<n:n = .
(17) is usually harder to be satised when there are more rms in the market, and it
must fail for su¢ ciently large n if vi has a nite upper bound.21
When (17) does not hold, the top productsignal structure induces a mixed strat-
egy pricing equilibrium. We show in the proof that the equilibrium industry prot
converges to limn!1 n:n   <n:n > 0 when there are many rms. This contrasts with
the literature discussed in the introduction, where rms disclose only information about
their own product, where rms disclose all information and price goes to zero when there
are many rms.
The consumer faces a trade o¤ between price and match quality, and with just
two rms we saw that this trade o¤ was typically resolved by revealing little product
information to consumers. With many rms, however, this trade-o¤ usually vanishes.
For example, with full information disclosure, the consumer can choose her preferred
product and under the stated condition for part (ii) she also pays a zero price as n!1,
and so in the limit this policy achieves the rst best for the consumer. The same outcome
21For example, for the standard uniform distribution (17) holds only for n = 2; however, for a
distribution with a heavy tail it can hold for a large n (e.g., for a Pareto distribution F (x) = 1  x 
with  > 1, for any given n it holds if  is su¢ ciently close to 1).
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can also be achieved by the top twosignal structure: the consumer regards the best
two products as perfect substitutes and so competition always drives price to zero for
any n  2 (which also implies that this signal structure outperforms no disclosure for the
consumer); on the other hand, the mismatch from buying one of the best two products
becomes negligible as n!1 if the valuation distribution has a thin tail (which is the
case if the density is log-concave). With a nite number of rms, however, the usual
trade-o¤ persists: full disclosure leads to perfect matching but also a positive mark-up;
the top two signal structure induces the lowest possible price but results in some
mismatch. Under the stated condition, we show that the price e¤ect dominates and so
the consumer always prefers the top twosignal structure. This simple signal structure
becomes even more appealing to the consumer than full disclosure if the need to choose
among many products involves high information processing costs for the consumer.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the limits to competition when product information possessed by
consumers can be designed exibly. Among signal structures which induce pure strategy
pricing equilibrium, we derived the optimal policy for rms and for consumers. The
rm-optimal signal structure amplies perceived product di¤erentiation by reducing
the number of consumers who regard the products as close substitutes. The rm-
optimal signal structure typically enables consumers to buy their preferred product,
and so it maximizes total welfare too. In particular, the rank or the top-product
signal structure which only informs consumers of which product is their best match can
sometimes be optimal for rms. The consumer-optimal policy, in contrast, dampens
perceived product di¤erentiation by increasing the number of marginal consumers and
so implements a low price. This low price can only be achieved by inducing a degree
of product mismatch, however, and so the policy does not maximize total welfare.
The top-two signal structure which informs consumers of their best two products (but
without ranking them) can be close to be optimal for consumers.
Besides the extensions discussed in section 4, there are other interesting extensions
to explore. One would be to consider situations where rms were asymmetric ex ante,
including the case of vertical di¤erentiation where one rm was known to provide a
higher match utility than its rival. One way to model this asymmetry is to consider an
asymmetric prior distribution F , and then one could investigate whether the optimal
information policy maintains, amplies or reduces this prior asymmetry, and whether
rms continue to have aligned interests over the design of consumer information. The
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bounds analysis which is independent of the information problem still applies in this
more general problem, but the main challenge stems from dealing with the MPC con-
straint.
Another possible extension would be to allow consumers to be heterogeneous ex
ante. For instance, a consumers valuation vi for product i might be decomposed
as vi = ai + bi, where consumers know the vector (a1; :::) from the start, from other
information sources, and there is scope to manipulate information only about the vector
(b1; :::). If there was enough heterogeneity in (a1; :::), then one might be able to rule out
mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium, rather than assuming them away as we mostly
did in this paper.
Finally, it would be valuable to embed this analysis within a framework in which
the information designeris modelled explicitly as an economic agent. Platforms typi-
cally compete with each other to provide intermediation services. If a prot-maximizing
platform chooses what product information to reveal to consumers, and also chooses
its fees to each side of the market, then the relative competitive intensity among plat-
forms on the two sides of the market and the platforms equilibrium fee structure will
presumably a¤ect whether its information policy is focussed more on delivering rm
prot or consumer surplus.
Technical Appendix
A su¢ cient condition for the outside option to be irrelevant. Recall that in our model
the consumers valuations for the two varieties are (v1; v2) and they lie inside [V; V +1]2.
The consumer is initially uncertain about her valuations. She receives a signal from a
signal structure f(sjv1; v2); Sg before purchase, and then estimates her valuation for
each product and makes a purchase decision. When we focus on signal structures which
induce a pure strategy pricing equilibrium, the following lemma reports a su¢ cient
condition for the zero outside option to be irrelevant.
Lemma 3 If V > 3, then under any signal structure which induces a pure strategy
equilibrium, equilibrium prices are below V and all consumers obtain positive surplus
when they buy from either rm.
Proof. With any signal structure the posterior valuation for a product lies in the
range [V; V + 1]. Suppose a signal structure induces rms i = 1; 2 to o¤er respective
prices p1 and p2 and to obtain prots 1 and 2. It is clear that neither p1 nor p2 can
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exceed V +1.22 Firm j will serve all consumers if it deviates to a low price p (or slightly
below it) such that V   p  V + 1   pi, i.e., if p  pi   1. (Given pi  V + 1, the
inequality V   p  V + 1   pi ensures that V   p  0 so that all consumers prefer to
buy from rm j than to buy nothing.) Therefore, we must have
pi   1  j : (18)
If rms are labelled so p1  p2, then (18) implies p1   1  2  p2 so that the price
di¤erence p1   p2 cannot exceed 1. Adding the pair of inequalities (18) implies that
p1 + p2   2  1 + 2  p1 ;
where the second inequality follows since industry prot cannot exceed the maximum
price p1, and so p2  2. Since p1  p2  1 it follows that p1  3, and so when 3 < V we
must have maxfp1; p2g < V .
The proof shows that equilibrium prices in a pure strategy equilibrium can never
exceed 3 and so must be below V under the stated condition. The outside option
is then irrelevant in the sense that if at most one rm deviates from equilibrium all
consumers continue to participate. The condition of V > 3 essentially requires that
valuations have a concentrated distribution in the sense that the range of valuations is
small relative to the basic utility of the product.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Let i, i = 1; 2, denote rm is equilibrium prot when (p1; p2)
are equilibrium prices. (They are now unspecied constants.) As already shown in
Lemma 3, given the valuation di¤erence between the two products is at most 1, in any
pure strategy equilibrium we must have pi  1  j for i 6= j to ensure that no rm has
a unilateral incentive to use a low price to capture all the demand. We can therefore
focus on prices and prots which satisfy this condition.
We rst show the if and only ifcondition on G for (p1; p2) to be the associated
equilibrium prices. (p1; p2) are the equilibrium prices under G if and only if no rm has
a unilateral incentive to deviate from their equilibrium price. If rm 2 deviates to price
p02 6= p2, the consumer buys from rm 2 if x  p1  p02. (Thus we suppose that if G has
a mass point at x = p1   p02, rm 2 serves all consumers at that mass point. This is
22If rm j did choose price pj > V + 1 in equilibrium, then no consumer will buy from it, and
rm i acts as a monopolist and its optimal price must be pi > 0. Then rm j can earn a strictly
positive prot by deviating to a price slightly below pi, as under any signal structure there must be a
positive probability that the consumer weakly prefer product j over product i given the two products
are symmetric ex ante.
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the natural tie-breaking rule given that the rm can achieve this outcome by charging
a price slightly below p02.) Therefore, rm 2 has no incentive to deviate if and only if
p02G(p1   p02)  2
holds for all p02. By changing variables from p
0
2 to x = p1   p02, we can write this no-
deviation requirement as (p1   x)G(x)  2, or G(x)  Up1;p2(x) for any x 2 [ 1; 1].
(It is unprotable for rm 2 to set a negative price p02, and so there are restrictions on
G only in the range where p02 = p1   x > 0, which is why there is maxf0; g in the
denominator of (7). In addition, a CDF cannot exceed 1 which is why there is minf1; g
in (7).)
Likewise, rm 1 has no incentive to deviate if and only if
p01(1 G((p01   p2) ))  1
for all p0. (As with rm 2, if G has an atom at x = p01   p2 the natural tie-breaking
assumption is that rm 1 serves all consumers at x. The deviation demand is written
as 1 G((p01 p2) ) as a CDF is dened to be right-continuous.) By changing variables
from p01 to x = p
0
1   p2, this constraint can be written as (p2 + x)(1   G(x ))  1,
or G(x )  Lp1;p2(x) for any x 2 [ 1; 1]. Given the lower bound is a continuous
function, this condition is actually equivalent to G(x)  Lp1;p2(x) for any x 2 [ 1; 1]
and 0  Lp1;p2( 1).23 The latter condition holds automatically given p2   1  1 and
so can be ignored.
It remains to show that Up1;p2  Lp1;p2 for any x 2 [ 1; 1] (so that a G between the
two bounds exists) if and only if i is dened as in (8). Suppose rst both prices are
positive. Notice that Lp1;p2 is increasing and becomes positive at x = 1   p2 (which
is no less than  1 given p2   1  1), and is concave whenever it is positive. Up1;p2 is
increasing and reaches 1 at x = p1   2 (which is no greater than 1 given p1   1  2),




denote rm is market share, and we must have q1 + q2 = 1 under full consumer
participation. One can then check that the two bounds coincide and equal rm 2s
market share q2 at x = p1  p2. These properties of the two bounds imply that Up1;p2 
Lp1;p2 for any x 2 [ 1; 1] if and only if the two bounds have the same slope at x = p1 p2,
23If G has a mass point at x =  1, the former constraint alone does not rule out the possibility of
Lp1;p2( 1) > 0 (which, however, is not compatible with G(x )  Lp1;p2(x) at x =  1).
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which requires 2=p22 = 1=p
2
1. Together with i = piqi and q1+q2 = 1, this then implies
qi = pi=(p1 + p2) and i = p2i =(p1 + p2) as dened in (8).
Suppose now at least one price is zero. If p1 > p2 = 0, one can check that the
only possibility for Up1;0  Lp1;0 for all x 2 [ 1; 1] is when 1 = p1 and 2 = 0 (if we
stipulate 0=0 =1), in which case Up1;0 = Lp1;0 = 0 for x < p1 and Up1;0 = 1 > Lp1;0 for
x  p1. (The case of p2 > p1 = 0 is similar.) If p1 = p2 = 0, they can be sustained as
equilibrium prices only if the consumer regards the two products as perfect substitutes,
i.e., if G is degenerate at x  0. One can check that both L0;0 and U0;0 equal the step
distribution function with all the mass at x = 0 (if we stipulate 0=0 =1). Hence, our
result holds trivially.




and Lp1;p2(0) = 1   1p2 . The only ifpart is straightforward. If
p1 = p2, then (8) implies that Up1;p2(0) = Lp1;p2(0) =
1
2
, and so G(0) = 1
2
. To prove the
ifpart, suppose G(0) = 1
2
. If (p1; p2) are the equilibrium prices under G, the bounds








from which we have p2
p1
 2q1 and p1p2  2q2, where qi is rm is market share dened





 2. This can hold only if
p1 = p2.
(ii) If (p1; p2) are the equilibrium prices under some distribution G, we must have
pj   1  i as pointed out before, and part (i) implies that rm is equilibrium prot
i must take the form in (8). To prove the if part, rst consider positive prices.
Notice that when pj   1  i, we have Up1;p2(1) = 1 and Lp1;p2( 1) = 0. Meanwhile, as
shown in the proof of part (i) we have Up1;p2  Lp1;p2 for any x when i takes the form
in (8). Hence, there always exists a distribution G which is between the two bounds.
Then the desired result follows from part (i). If p1 = p2 = 0, they satisfy pj   1  i
and can be supported as equilibrium prices by a degenerate distribution at x  0. If
p1 > p2 = 0, then pj   1  i requires p1  1. In this case, the two prices can be
sustained in equilibrium by, for example, a degenerate distribution at x  p1. (The
case of p2 > p1 = 0 is similar.)
Finally, we show jpi   pjj  1 and pi  2 in any pure strategy equilibrium. From
pi 1  j  pj, it is clear that the price di¤erence cannot exceed 1. To prove the second




the second inequality is because in equilibrium rm is market share is qi = pi=(p1+p2)
and so the rm with a higher price has a higher market share. Then p1  2 follows
immediately. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. (i) First consider the rm problem. Suppose that an asymmetric
posterior G induces an equilibrium with prices (p1; p2). Without loss of generality, let us
consider the case with p1  p2 (and so 1  2). (Figure 2a illustrates the two bounds
on G in this case. Recall that even an asymmetric posterior will induce symmetric
equilibrium prices p1 = p2 if G(0) = 12 .) In this case, we must have 1 + 2  p2. Since






for any ~x 2 [ 1; 1]. Now consider a symmetric CDF Ĝ(x) which equals L22(x) for
negative x, where L22 is the lower bound of the posteriors which induce a symmetric
equilibrium with price p = 22. We show below that Ĝ is an MPC of the prior, and
so it is a legitimate posterior and induces a symmetric equilibrium in which each rm
earns 2. That is, Ĝ outperforms G for each rm.
To prove Ĝ is an MPC of the prior, given (19) it su¢ ces to show L22  Lp1;p2 for
negative x. L22 is positive and equal to 1  222+x when x >  2; Lp1;p2(x) is positive
and equal to 1  1
p2+x
when x > 1   p2. Given 1 + 2  p2, the latter is positive in a








where the second inequality is from 1  2. Therefore, we must have L22  Lp1;p2 .
(If p1 < p2, then 1 < 2 and 1+ 2 < p2, and so L22 < Lp1;p2(x) whenever the latter
is positive. The same argument then works for a symmetric price p which is slightly
above 22. As a result, Ĝ strictly outperforms G for each rm.)
(ii) We then consider the consumer problem. Suppose that an asymmetric posterior
G induces an equilibrium with prices (p1; p2) and industry prot . It is now more
convenient to focus on the case of p1  p2. (Figure 2c illustrates the two bounds on G
in this case.) Let  = p1   p2  0, and also notice that we must have 2  12  1








where the last term is the e¢ ciency loss from the mismatch caused by the price disper-
sion.24
24When the consumer has an expected x 2 (0;), she should choose rm 1 (and get utility v1) from
the social planners perspective, but she actually chooses rm 2 (and gets utility v2 instead). This




 1G(x)dx < , consumer surplus then must be less than , and so G will be
dominated by no information disclosure (which induces a symmetric but degenerated
posterior).25
From now on we assume Z 0
 1
G(x)dx   : (21)
We aim to show that there exists a symmetric posterior which induces a symmetric
equilibrium with the same industry prot  but (weakly) higher total e¢ ciency. (If
p1 > p2, the following argument implies that a strict improvement exists.)
Consider a symmetric CDF
Ĝ(x) =
(
0 if x < m
U(x) if m  x  0
;
where U(x) is the upper bound of posteriors which induce a symmetric equilibrium






Notice that given 2  12 and p1  , we have





   x (23)
whenever Up1;p2 is less than 1 (which must be the case for a negative x). Meanwhile,









where the second inequality is implied by (21). These two observations imply that (22)
has a unique solution m 2 ( 1; 
2
), and Ĝ crosses G at most once and from below.









for ~x 2 [ 1; 0], where the second inequality is because G is an MPC of F . Therefore,
the symmetric Ĝ is an MPC of F and so is a legitimate posterior.
25In this case, the dominating distribution does not generate the same prot as the original dis-
tribution. This is why this Lemma 2 cannot be directly used to prove the welfare frontier result in
Proposition 3 later.
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is the x at which the lower bound L(x) becomes
positive, Ĝmust be also between L and U for negative x. Hence, Ĝ induces a symmet-
ric equilibrium with industry prot . It also yields total welfare +
R 0
 1 Ĝ(x)dx, which
is (weakly) greater than (20) under G given (22). Therefore, a symmetric posterior Ĝ
with m dened in (22) is at least the same good as G for the consumer. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that whenever Lp is positive, 1   Lp = p2(p+x) is log-
convex. Therefore, when 1   F is log-concave in the range of negative x, the single-
crossing property as in the uniform example continues to hold. Then the same argument





F (x)dx =  ;
from which we derive p in (12). This equality immediately implies that the symmetric
posterior G which equals Lp for negative x is the unique optimal posterior, and it also
leads to no mismatch and so maximizes total surplus. 
Proof of Corollary 1. When f is log-concave, the full-information price is well dened
and is equal to pF = 1=(2f(0)). When f is log-concave, it must be weakly increasing
















where the inequality follows since F lies above its tangent at x = 0. Using this result
and (12), we have p  1
2(1 log 2)pF .


















Using this result and (12), we have p  1
1 log 2pF . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Following the same argument as in the main text, we know
that the consumer-optimal symmetric price must be below the full-information price
pF . Notice that Up =
p
2(p x) is log-convex when it is less than one. Hence, when prior
CDF F is log-concave in the range [ 1; 0], the upper bound Up crosses F once and from
above in that range for any p < pF . Then the same argument used for the uniform
example shows that an optimal G given p < pF is given by (13). This immediately
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implies that under the consumer-optimal solution there is mismatch and total welfare
is not maximized.














where xp is the intercept point of F (x) and Up(x). Since F (xp)  Up(xp), it follows
that p
p xp = 2F (xp), and so (26) equals
1
2
(2F (xp)   log(2F (xp))   3). This decreases
in p since the intercept point xp increases with p (which is because the upper bound
crosses F from above). Therefore, the optimal intercept point x satises 2F (x) = ,
or x = F 1(1
2
). The optimal price p then satises p

p x = 2F (x
) = , from which
we obtain p =  
1 x
 and so (15). 
Proof of Corollary 2. When f is log-concave, F is convex on [ 1; 0], and so it is below
the linear line 1
2
(1 + x). This implies F 1(1
2
)     1. Using this result and (15),
we have p  . Also, p should never exceed . (This is because  is the maximum
match e¢ ciency improvement relative to a random match. Given the consumer-optimal
policy is better than no-information disclosure (in which case consumers buy a random
product at a zero price), the consumer-optimal price should not exceed .) When f is
log-concave, we have known from (25) that   1
2
pF , and so p  12pF .
On the other hand, when F is convex on [ 1; 0], we have 
2








), where the rst equality is from the proof of Proposition 2 and the nal
equality is from pF = 12f(0) . This implies
 x
pF
 1   . Since p =  
1 x
, we deduce
p  pF . 
Proof of Proposition 3. Under Conditions 1 and 2(ii), the full-information price pF is
well dened and F is log-concave on [ 1; 0]. When p  pF , it is possible to nd a
supporting posterior G between the bounds which is an MPC of F such that (3) holds
with equality (i.e. the full e¢ ciency is achieved). This is because given p < p the lower
bound Lp must have (3) hold with strict inequality, while given p  pF the log-convex
upper bound Up must be above the log-concave F in the range of x < 0. One way to
construct such a G is: G(x) = Lp(x) for x < m and G(x) = Up(x) for m  x  0,
where m is chosen to make (3) bind. Since there is no mismatch with such a posterior,
this achieves the maximum consumer surplus +    p for a given p.
To prove the result for p < pF , we rst need the following result to rule out asym-
metric posteriors:
Lemma 4 When F is log-concave on [ 1; 0], if an asymmetric posterior induces a pure
strategy equilibrium with industry prot less than pF , there exists a symmetric posterior
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which induces the same prot but weakly higher total welfare (and so weakly higher
consumer surplus).
Proof. Suppose that a posteriorG induces an asymmetric equilibrium with industry
prot  < pF . Without loss of generality, suppose the equilibrium prices are p1  p2,
and so the bounds for G are like in Figure 2c. Let  = p1   p2  0, and notice in this
case we have 2  12  1 and   p1. As explained in the proof of Lemma 1, total
welfare in this case is (20).
Now consider a symmetric CDF ~G(x) = minfF (x); U(x)g for negative x, where
U is the upper bound for posteriors which induce a symmetric equilibrium with price
p = . Given  < pF , the log-convex U must cross the log-concave F once and from
above in the range of negative x. Notice that ~G must be an MPC of the prior and so is
a legitimate posterior. It is also between the bounds U and L since L < LpF  F .




~G(x)dx. If this total welfare is higher than that under G, then ~G
leads to higher consumer surplus.
Notice that Up1;p2, the upper bound of G, is log-convex, and so it crosses F once at,

























Here the second inequality used that G is an MPC of F (which implies
R x̂
 1G(x)dx R x̂
 1 F (x)dx), and the last inequality used that given 2 
1
2







whenever the former is less than 1 (which must be the case for a negative x). This
proves the desired result.26
26Note that this argument does not always extend to the case when Up1;p2 crosses F multiple times,
and that is why we need F to be log-concave.
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Now we can focus on symmetric posteriors when we solve for the maximum consumer
surplus given industry prot p < pF . Then the same analysis as in the consumer-optimal
problem in section 3.4 applies, and the maximum consumer surplus, for a given p < pF ,
equals (14). In this case total welfare is not maximized, and as shown in the proof of
Proposition 2, the derivative of (14) with respect to p decreases in p. Hence, the welfare
frontier is concave in p, and it reaches the optimum at the positive consumer-optimal
price in (15). 
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In this online appendix, we report the omitted proofs and details for the various
extensions discussed in section 4.
A.1 Section 4.1 on relevant outside option
We rst report a su¢ cient condition for (16), the condition for rms to obtain the
rst-best prot.
Claim 1 Suppose that v1 and v2 are independently distributed with density which weakly
decreases over the support [0; 1]. Then condition (16) is satised and the rank signal
structure generates rst-best prot.
Proof. Using H + L = 2, we rewrite (16) as 3H  4. Let H(vi) be the CDF
for each valuation, with weakly decreasing density h(vi). Then the CDF for the variable
maxfv1; v2g is H2(v), and











(1  z)(3z   1)
h(H 1(z))
dz ;
where H 1() is the inverse function to H(). Here, the rst equality is from integration
by parts and the assumption that the lower bound of vi is zero, and the nal equality
follows by changing variables from v to z = H(v). Noting that the above integrand is
negative for z < 1
3
and positive for z > 1
3
, and that h(H 1(z)) weakly decreases with z,
it follows that







[(1  z)(3z   1)]dz = 0
as claimed.
In the following, we report the details of the one-dimensional model introduced
in section 4.1. Suppose the consumer values product 1 at v1 = 1 + 12x and product
2 at v2 = 1   12x, where x = v1   v2 2 [ 1; 1] indicates her relative preference for
product 1 and the consumers average valuation 1
2
(v1 + v2)  1 is constant. Let F be
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the symmetric prior distribution for x, and let  =
R 0
 1 F (x)dx measure the dispersion
of the prior distribution. The information environment is the same as introduced in
section 2. The consumer will buy a product only if its expected net surplus is positive.
We restrict our attention to symmetric signal structures which induce a pure strategy
pricing equilibrium.
Extended bounds analysis. We rst extend the posterior bounds analysis to this new
setup when the market is fully covered in equilibrium. (This analysis will be used to
prove the full-coverage result in Claim 2 below.) Consider a symmetric posterior G(x)
which induces a symmetric equilibrium price p. Suppose rm 2 deviates to p0. A type-x
consumer will buy from rm 2 if and only if 1   x
2
  p0  maxf0; 1 + x
2
  pg, i.e., if
x  minf2(1  p0); p  p0g. Hence, the no-deviation condition for rm 2 is:
p0G(minf2(1  p0); p  p0g)  1
2
p (27)
holds for any p0 and with equality at p0 = p. To implement a price p  1
2
(which is the
lowest valuation for a product), the extensive margin 2(1  p0) does not matter and so
the upper bound of G is (11) as before. To implement a higher price p > 1
2
, we need to
deal with the extensive margin explicitly.27
For convenience, dene













Here, Up(x) is the same upper bound (11) as before, and UMp (x) is the upper bound
when the outside option binds. One can check that UMp and Up intersect only once, and
let ~xp denote the solution to UMp (x) = Up(x). Then U
M
p > Up if and only if x < ~xp.
(Note that ~xp  1 given p never exceeds 32 , the highest valuation for a product.) Using
this notation, condition (27) can be written as
G(x)  maxfUMp (x); Up(x)g
and
G(minf ~xp; 0g) = 12 : (29)
Using rm 1s no-deviation condition, we can derive the lower bound of G. But
given G is symmetric, the lower bound is simply the mirror image of the upper bound.
The qualitative form of the bounds depend on the size of p as shown in Figure A1
below. For p  1
2
, the bounds are the same as in section 3. For price 1
2
< p  1, we
27Note that if p > 1 then a consumer with posterior x  0 will not participate. However, the signal
could induce a gap in the posterior distribution around x = 0, in which case it is possible to have full
coverage with a price p > 1.
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have ~xp 2 ( 1; 0] so the upper bound takes the form of UMp for x < ~xp as illustrated
in Figure A1-a. The upper bound passes through the point (0; 1
2
), and the bounds
conditions automatically imply (29) which is now G(0) = 1
2
. In particular, the lower
bound in the range x 2 [ 1; 0] is the same as in section 3. For a price 1 < p < 4
3
, the
bounds are shown in Figure A1-b. We have ~xp 2 (0; p2) where
p
2
is the value of x where
Up reaches 1. The crucial di¤erence is that now (29) implies G( ~xp) = 12 . This requires
G(x) = 1
2
for any x 2 [ ~xp; ~xp], and so in this middle range there are no consumers






and the middle range is so large that the bounds are as shown in Figure A1-c.






















(c) p  4
3
Figure A1: Bounds on G to implement price p > 1
2
with binding outside option
Full market coverage. We now show that the optimal signal structure must induce
full market coverage in equilibrium.
Claim 2 A rm-optimal or consumer-optimal symmetric signal structure induces an
equilibrium with full market coverage.
Proof. It is easy to prove that the market is fully covered in the consumer-optimal
solution. A consumer-optimal signal structure must be weakly better for the consumer
than no information disclosure, where consumers buy a random product at price zero
and so consumer surplus is 1. Since the match e¢ ciency improvement relative to random
match is at most  =
R 0
 1 F (x)dx 
1
2
, rms cannot earn more than  in the consumer-
optimal solution. Suppose in contrast to the claim that the market is fully covered
that some consumers do not buy, in which case the price must exceed 1 and consumers
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around x = 0 are excluded. Then a feasible unilateral deviation is to o¤er price at 1,
in which case at least half of the consumers will buy from the deviating rm. Hence,
each rms equilibrium prot must be greater than 1
2
, which is a contradiction.
The argument for the rm-optimal policy is less straightforward. To prove that
the market is fully covered in the rm-optimal solution, it su¢ ces to show that for
any signal structure which induces a partial-coverage equilibrium, there exists another
signal structure which induces a full-coverage equilibrium with a strictly higher industry
prot.
Consider a symmetric posterior distribution G which is an MPC of F and which
induces an equilibrium where each rm charges p > 1 and only a fraction  < 1 of
consumers buy. (If p  1 all consumers would buy in equilibrium.) In this case,
industry prot is p. Notice that ~xp  2(p 1) > 0 solves 1+ x2 = p, so consumers with
x  ~xp buy from rm 1 and those with x   ~xp buy from rm 2. Other consumers in
the range of ( ~xp; ~xp) are excluded from the market. Industry prot in this equilibrium
must be no less than one, i.e., p  1, since each rm could attract half the consumers
by o¤ering price 1.
Suppose rm 1 o¤ers the equilibrium price p but rm 2 deviates to p0. A type-x
consumer will buy from rm 2 if and only if 1   x
2
  p0  maxf0; 1 + x
2
  pg. This
requires x  minf2(1  p0); p  p0g. The no-deviation condition for the partial-coverage
equilibrium is then p0G(minf2(1 p0); p p0g)  1
2
p for any p0, with equality at p0 = p.
Changing variables yields




where UMp and Up are given in (28). Here, U
M
p > Up if and only if x < ~xp. The upper
bound passes through the point ( ~xp; 2 ). For our purpose, we only need the lower
bound which is the mirror image of the upper bound:
L;p(x) =
(
1  Up( x) if x <  ~xp
maxf
2
; 1  UMp ( x)g if   ~xp  x < 0
:
In the following, we will use
L ;p(x) =
(
1  Up( x) if x <  ~xp

2
if   ~xp  x < 0
(31)
which is weakly lower than L;p(x).
Let p̂ = p  1 and construct a new symmetric posterior which is equal to
L1;p̂(x) =
(
1  Up̂( x) if x <  ~xp̂
1
2
if   ~xp̂  x < 0
(32)
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in the range of negative x. Note that this is the lower bound of posteriors which support
a full-coverage equilibrium with price p̂  1. In the following, we show that L1;p̂ is a




 1G(x)dx for any u 2 ( 1; 0]. (Then
a similar posterior associated with a price slightly above p̂ must be an MPC of G.)
Since L ;p  G, it su¢ ces to show L1;p̂ is a strict MPC of L ;p. One can check that L1;p̂
crosses L ;p only once and from below in the range of negative x. Therefore, it su¢ ces





























which further simplies to
p log 2  p
2  p < 2(  1)(p  1) :






Since p  1, we have p




p < 2. This must be true given p should never exceed the highest possible valuation 3
2
.
This completes the proof.
Firm-optimal solution. We now report the rm-optimal symmetric solution.
Claim 3 When 1  F is log-concave, the rm-optimal solution involves no mismatch,
and is as follows:
(i) when   1
2
(1   log 2)  0:153, the rm-optimal price is p in (12), which satises
p  1, and is uniquely implemented by Lp;
(ii) when 1
2
(1 log 2) <  < 1
3







1   and is uniquely implemented by a modied posterior lower bound;
(iii) when   1
3
(which is equivalent to (16)), the rm-optimal price is p = H = 1+
which earns rms the rst-best prot and is implemented by the rank signal structure.
Proof. The lower bound of the posterior for x 2 [ 1; 0] across the three cases
depicted in Figure A1 can be dened as
~Lp(x) =
(
Lp(x) if x < minf0; ~xpg
1
2
if minf0; ~xpg  x < 0
;
48
and it increases with p. Given 1 F is log-concave and 1 Lp is log-convex, ~Lp crosses F
at most once and from below in the range of negative x. This implies that the optimal
posterior must take the form of the lower bound, and the optimal price p solvesZ 0
 1
~Lp(x)dx =  =
Z 0
 1
F (x)dx : (33)
(This implies there is no mismatch under the rm-optimal signal structure.) We then






(1  log 2), (33) has a unique solution p = 2
1 log 2  1







has a unique solution p 2 (1; 4
3
) which solvesZ 0
 1
~Lp(x)dx = 1  p2 [1 + log(
4
p
  2)] =  ;
and ~Lp takes the form in Figure A1-b; (iii) if   13 , which implies (16), (33) has a
unique solution p = 1 +  and ~Lp takes the form in Figure A1-c.
Intuitively, if the prior distribution is su¢ ciently concentrated, the rm-optimal
price must be low so that the outside option is irrelevant and the solution is the same
as in section 3. In contrast, if the prior distribution is su¢ ciently dispersed that (16)
holds the rst-best outcome is achievable. In between, the optimal solution is a mixture
of these two cases, and it changes smoothly with . In all three cases, there is no product














Figure A2: Firm-optimal G when outside option binds
To illustrate, consider the uniform example with  = 1
4
. Case (ii) in Claim 3 applies
and the optimal G is as described in Figure A2. The distribution has two symmetric
mass points (represented as the dots on the density gure) and no consumers located
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between them. When  becomes larger, the optimal distribution has more weight on
the two mass points, and as  approaches 1
3
it converges to a binary distribution which
is implemented by the rank structure and earns rms the rst-best prot.
Consumer-optimal solution. The consumer-optimal policy is not a¤ected by the
presence of the outside option. As pointed out in the proof of Claim 2, the consumer-
optimal price is no greater than . Given  =
R 0




price is no greater than the minimum valuation for a product in our setup. Therefore,
the outside option is irrelevant for the consumer-optimal problem.
A.2 Section 4.2 on mixed strategies
Here we report the proof of Proposition 5. Let F denote the symmetric prior
distribution of x = v1 v2 andG denote a symmetric posterior distribution of (expected)
x. Consumer surplus under G is no greater than +
R 0
 1G(x)dx (which is the surplus
when each consumer buys their preferred product) minus industry prot in a symmetric
equilibrium with posterior G. We rst derive a lower bound on that industry prot:
Claim 4 Suppose V  1 and let G be a symmetric distribution for x = v1   v2. Then







Proof. Note that (34) is zero if and only if the distribution G is degenerate at
x = 0, in which case equilibrium prot is also zero and the result holds. Suppose now
that (34) is positive, and slightly abusing the notation we denote its value by p > 0.
Since x which solves (34) must be negative, we have p  2. Suppose in contrast to the
statement that there is an equilibrium where each rm obtains prot  strictly below
p=2. Firm 1, say, will never choose a price below  in this equilibrium (as then it
obtains lower prot even if it serves all consumers). Since a rms prot increases with
its rivals price, rm 2s prot  is then at least equal to the maximum prot it can
obtain if rm 1 chooses price . Given  < p=2  1  V , if rm 1 chooses price 
the outside option is not relevant for consumers, regardless of the price chosen by rm
2. Hence rm 2s prot  satises
  max
p0
: p0  Prfv2   p0  v1   g = max
p0
: p0G(   p0) = max
x2[ 1;1]
: (   x)G(x) ;
where the nal equality follows after changing to the variable x =  p0. Thus for any
x 2 [ 1; 1] we have (1 G(x))   xG(x), in which case  is at least equal to p=2.
As this contradicts our assumption, the result is proved.
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Slightly abusing notation let p denote (34) for a given G. (The proof of Lemma
4 shows that p  2.) Then an upper bound on consumer surplus with posterior G is
+
R 0
 1G(x)dx p. By construction, for any x 2 [ 1; 0) we have G(x)=(1 G(x)) 
p
 2x ,
or G(x)  p
p 2x . (If the lower bound p in Lemma 4 is attained, then G should equal
p
p 2x for some x < 0.) Since G cannot exceed
1
2
for x 2 [ 1; 0], it follows that G in the
negative range lies below the upper bound













Given the prior distribution F , let  p denote the maximum match e¢ ciency when
the lower bound on industry prot is p, i.e.,  p =: maxG
R 0
 1G(x)dx subject to (i)
G lying below the upper bound Ûp(x) in (35) (and touching it at some x < 0) and
(ii) G being a symmetric MPC of F . Then an upper bound on consumer surplus is
+maxp( p   p). Notice that for a given p, the optimization problem in dening  p is
similar to the problem of nding the best symmetric G for consumers under the pure
strategy restriction in section 3.4, except that here is the relevant upper bound for
G is Ûp instead of Up in (11) which for negative x equals p=(2p   2x) and lies below
Ûp. However, for small p, which is usually the relevant case for the consumer-optimal
solution, the two bounds are very close and for this reason the use of mixed strategies
cannot signicantly benet consumers.
The remaining task is to calculate  p, and this can be done in a manner similar to
the way we found the consumer-optimal policy for a given price with pure strategies.
If the prior has a log-concave density, then F is log-concave on [ 1; 0], while the upper
bound Ûp is log-convex in the range [ 1; 12p]. For relatively small p, which will be
the relevant case, the upper bound Ûp therefore crosses the prior F twice.28 See Figure
A3 for an illustration when the prior is uniform. Let x̂p denote the smaller of the two
crossing points given p (i.e. the smaller solution to p
p 2x = F (x)). As in section 3.4,
two necessary conditions for a feasible G are that it satises the MPC constraint at the
intercept point x̂p, and that G lies below Ûp for x 2 [x̂p; 0]. The bold curve on Figure
A3 is then a convenient candidate for the optimal G.
28To see that with the p which maximizes p   p the upper bound Ûp crosses the prior F , we argue
as follows. For any p we must have p   since G is an MPC of F . Let ~p denote the price such that
Û~p just touches F . Then setting G  F solves the stated problem for  ~p, in which case  ~p = . For
p > ~p, when the upper bound Ûp lies strictly above F , we must have p   p     p <  ~p   ~p. As







Figure A3: Consumer-optimal way to reach the prot lower bound p
We have not shown that the candidate G illustrated as the bold curve in Figure A3
is an MPC of F , as Ûp is above F for x close to zero. Therefore, the resulting  p based
on this G is an upper bound on the feasible match e¢ ciency when the MPC constraint
is fully considered.







Ûp(x)dx  p : (36)



















(F (x̂p)   log(2F (x̂p))   52) by using
p
p 2x̂p = F (x̂p). Note that x̂p increases
with p given that Ûp crosses F from above at the smaller of the two crossing points.
This derivative therefore decreases with p, and so the point x̂ which maximizes the
upper bound (36) satises F (x̂) = ̂, where ̂  0:043 is the root of    log(2) = 5
2
.
Evaluating the upper bound (36) at this crossing point x̂ shows the maximum consumer




F (x)dx  x̂F (x̂) =  
Z x̂
 1
xdF (x) : (37)
On the other hand, following the proof of Proposition 2, the optimal consumer

























xdF (x) : (38)
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(Here, the second equality used p

p x = 2F (x
) = , the denition of , and (15),
while the last equality follows by integration by parts.) This is the same expression as
(37) but using x < x̂.
Finally, we show that consumer surplus with pure strategies in (38) comes close to








  xF (x) +
R x
 1 F (x)dx




  xF (x) +
R x
 1 F (x)dx





  xF (x̂) >
+ F (x)
+ F (x̂)
 1 + F (x
)







Here, the rst inequality uses
R x̂
x F (x)dx < (x̂
   x)F (x̂), the third inequality uses
 1 < x < 0, and the nal inequality uses the fact that V  1 implies   1. Thus,
when the prior has log-concave density the maximum consumer surplus attainable with
pure strategies attains at least 98.4% of the consumer surplus which could be available
when mixed pricing strategies were permitted. This completes the proof of Proposition
5.
A.3 Section 4.3 on more rms
We rst report the proof of Proposition 6. (i) The rst-best result is explained in the
main text. Here we report a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium under the top-product
signal structure when condition (17) does not hold, and show that the industry prot
in this equilibrium is bounded away from zero even if n ! 1. (It is straightforward
but lengthy to verify the equilibrium. All the details are available upon request.29)
For notational simplicity, dene v = n:n and  = n:n   <n:n, where n:n is the
expected valuation for the top product and <n:n is the expected valuation for a non-
top product. Under the top-product signal structure, with probability 1
n
a product is
regarded as the top one and so evaluated at v by the consumer, and with probability
1   1
n
it is regarded as a non-top one and so evaluated at v   . In the following, we
focus on the case with  < (1   1
n
)v, the opposite of condition (17) for the best-rst
result. Then the pricing game with binary valuations has no pure strategy equilibrium.









29It is an extension of the duopoly analysis in Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) when consumers have
binary valuations and receive binary signals.
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(Note that the left-hand side increases in a from 1
2
to 1 and the right-hand side de-
creases in a from 1 to 0. Hence, (39) has a unique solution, and it is also easy to see
limn!1 an = 0.)
When   v
2+an
, it is an equilibrium that each rm independently draws a price















if p 2 [l + ; l + 2]
;
where l = an and  = l+n is each rms equilibrium prot. (The condition  
v
2+an
ensures l + 2  v.) As n ! 1, the price distribution does not degenerate to 0, and
industry prot n converges to limn!1  > 0.
When v
2+an
<  < (1  1
n
)v, it is an equilibrium that each rm independently draws






















if p 2 [l + ; v)
1 if p  v
;








and  = l+
n
is each rms equilibrium prot. (The condition for this case ensures
l < v   < l +  < v.) This distribution has a gap in the interval [v   ; l + ) and a
mass point on the top. As n!1, l = 0 and the price distribution does not degenerate
to 0, and industry prot n converges to limn!1  > 0 as in the previous case.
(ii) When the outside option is irrelevant and fvig are i.i.d., the case under full
information disclosure is the Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) model.30 Slightly abusing the
notation, let F (v) and f(v) be each vis CDF and density function respectively. When






and it decreases in n and goes to 0 as n ! 1. Therefore, full disclosure achieves the
rst-best outcome for the consumer when there are many rms.
30Perlo¤, J., and S. Salop (1985): Equilibrium with Product Di¤erentiation,Review of Economic
Studies, 52(1), 107120.
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Under the top-two signal structure, as explained in the main text, rms charge a
zero price in equilibrium. Hence, consumer surplus is 1
2
(n:n + n 1:n), where n 1:n is
the expected valuation for the second best product. When f is log-concave, we must
have limn!1(n:n   n 1:n) = 0. Therefore, the top-two signal structure also achieves
the rst-best outcome for the consumer when there are many rms.
Now consider the case with a nite n. The consumer prefers the top-two signal
structure if 1
2
(n:n + n 1:n) > n:n   pF , or equivalently if n:n   n 1:n < 2pF . The
CDF of maxfvig is Fn(v)  F (v)n and the CDF of the second-best match is Fn 1(v) 
F (v)n + n(1  F (v))F (v)n 1. Then










(1  F (v))F (v)n 1dv
= n(n:n   n 1:n 1) :
That is, the expected gap between the best match and the second-best match equals
n times the expected di¤erence between the best match among n options and the best
match among n   1 options. Therefore, it su¢ ces to show n:n   n 1:n 1 < 2npF . In
fact, a stronger version of this inequality holds:




This means that the match e¢ ciency improvement from having one more rm in the
Perlo¤-Salop model is less than the new entrants equilibrium prot. This is already
proved in Anderson et al. (1995) when f is log-concave.31 (They use this observation to
prove in their Theorem 1 that the Perlo¤-Salop model with free entry leads to excessive
entry.)
Here we report a simpler proof developed in Tan and Zhou (2020).32 As in Anderson










tn 2l(t)dt < 1 : (42)
When f is log-concave, the quantile density function l(t) must be concave. Lemma 3
in Tan and Zhou (2020) shows that (42) holds for any concave l(t) if and only if it
31Anderson, S., A. de Palma, and Y. Nesterov (1995): Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal
Provision of Products,Econometrica, 63(6), 12811301.
32Tan, G., and J. Zhou (2020): Consumer Heterogeneity and Ine¢ ciency in Oligopoly Markets,
mimeo.
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holds for any triangle-shaped function l(t) = t

for t 2 [0; ] and 1 t
1  for t 2 [; 1],
where  2 (0; 1) is a constant. (This is basically because any concave function can be
represented as a mixture of triangle-shaped functions.) Substituting the triangle-shaped





(1  n 1) < 1, 1  
n 1
1   < n  1 ;
which must be true.
Finally, we report a su¢ cient condition for the outside option to be irrelevant in the
case with n rms if we focus on signal structures which induce a pure strategy pricing
equilibrium. Given the following result, the outside option is irrelevant in the sense that
if at most one rm deviates from equilibrium all consumers continue to participate.
Claim 5 If V > 3, then under any signal structure which induces a pure strategy
pricing equilibrium, there are at least two rms which o¤er equilibrium prices below V
and the consumer can obtain a positive surplus from buying at least from these rms.
Proof. Without loss of generality consider a pure strategy equilibrium with prices
p1  p2      pn. Let i be rm is equilibrium prot.
Case 1: pn 1 = pn = 0. In this case our result holds trivially.
Case 2: pn 1 > pn = 0, i.e., one rm sets a zero price and all other rms set strictly
positive prices. This is impossible in equilibrium as rm n can then always raise its
price slightly and at the same time still has a positive demand. (This is because under
any signal structure, given products are ex ante symmetric, there must be a positive
probability that the consumer weakly prefers rm ns product over others.)
Case 3: pn > 0, i.e., all rms set strictly positive prices. In this case, all rms
must earn strictly positive prots in equilibrium. Suppose in contrast a rm earns a
zero prot due to a zero demand. It can then deviate and lower its price to obtain a
positive prot, for example, by setting a strictly positive price which is below both pn
and the consumers highest possible (expected) valuation for its product. This implies
that in equilibrium we must have pi  V +1 and p1  pn  1. (Recall that V +1 is the
valuation upper bound, and if p1 pn > 1, the consumer would never buy from rm 1.)
Now consider the no-deviation conditions for rms n 1 and n. First, in equilibrium
we must have pn 1   1  n, since rm n can win the whole market by setting a price
slightly below pn 1   1. (Note that given pn 1  V + 1, the consumer prefers to buy
product n at price pn 1   1 than to buy nothing.) Second, we also have pn   1  n 1
for a similar reason. Adding these two inequalities together implies
pn 1 + pn   2  n + n 1  pn 1 ;
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where the second inequality follows since the total prot of rms n   1 and n cannot
exceed the maximum price pn 1. Then we deduce pn  2. Since p1   pn  1, it follows
p1  3, and so when 3 < V , all prices must be less than V .
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